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THE purpose of this paper is to give an account of the develop-
ment of Chinese thought on the important problem of author-
ity and freedom in ethics, a problem which is fundamental for any
ethical system. It makes a very great dilTerence to ethical theory
whether the individual's actions shall be determined by standards ot
conduct which are imposed upon him from without, or whether
he shall be free to work out those standards of conduct for himself.
On this problem ancient and medieval Chinese thought ended in
accepting the principle of authority by adopting the Confucian philos-
ophy. While today we rebel against external authority in moral
matters, yet we must remember that the ancient and medieval world
universally adopted a different attitude. In the legalism of the
Pharisees, the law codes of the Brahmans, the authoritarianism of
the Christian Catholic church, and the philosopher-ruler of Plato's
ideal republic, who was to be the absolute authority for the mass of
the people, reflective thought everywhere decided in favor of author-
ity. Consequently we are not surprised that it was also victorious in
China ; rather w^e should be surprised to find that so much opposi-
tion was given to its sway.
The situation in China was similar to that in ancient Greece—
a
gradual growth in wealth and commerce ; a group of city-states sit-
uated in a homogeneous territory—this time inland instead of on a
sea-coast ; growing intercourse between them, the growth of a litera-
ture and of literary centers. There were a number of diflferences
;
the most important of these was the remarkable historical sense of
the people. In the eyes of the people of the time of Confucius, China
was already an ancient country w^ith authentic records going back
for at least half a millenium, and traditions going back more than a
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millenium more. Hence we find in ancient China a historic sense
that Hnks her thought more with that of our own time than with
the timeless universals of Greece. At the same time we find a
strengthening of the authority of the past through its very antiquity.
A second difl:'erence lay in the possession by China of an Emperor
who was theoretically the center of the political organism. While
his power was shadowy in the golden age of philosophy, so that
there was no central authority to check speculation, yet the possession
of the imperial tradition meant much for the development of the
ideal of a political system (and hence of an ethical doctrine) in which
there was an Emperor, a Sage-King to wield the authority of
the state—a much more convenient figure to head up an authoritar-
ian doctrine than Plato's philosopher-rulers in an aristocratic "Re-
public." Thirdly, there was no slave class in China. The Chinese
were a homogeneous people not much given to fighting ; while there
are traditions of a coming from the West (unconfirmed by any re-
liable evidence) it was by a process of peaceful penetration rather
than by conquest that they gained their place in the sun. They
were peaceful agriculturalists rather than warlike herdsmen. Hence
we find in China a larger amount of genuine democracy and of com-
munity of interest between the governors and governed than else-
where.
The ancient Chinese social system was organized around the
famjly "and clan. This family was the typical patriarchial family
.
the father or grandfather possessed the patria potestas, and his
children, grandchildren, and other relatives, together with then-
wives and children, lived in one household. Their gods were chiefly
the spirits of the honored ancestors, who still cared for their de-
scendants, and whose worship and care bound the family into a
greater unity. In such a relatively static agricultural environment, Jt
was natural that the experience of age should receive honor and
authority. Hence the greatest happiness that could come to any-
one was to live to a gfood old age until the headship of the family
descended upon him, and the whole clan should honor and serve him.
Even today, "Long Life" is one of the three greatest happinesses.
Thus there came to be clear distinctions between older and younger,
so that different words were used for the terms, "older brother" and
"younger brother", "older sister" and "younger sister," "uncle who
is older than my father" and "uncle who is younger than my father,"
"older brother's wife" and "younger brother's wife", to a great de-
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^ree of refinement. When reflective thought came to be apphed to
this situation, two especial virtues were apphed to these relations,
"filial piety", and "Reverence for the elder". In addition there was
the virtue of Li, later to become one of the two most important moral
concepts, translated "propriety", "ceremony", or "the rules of proper
conduct", which included all the various observances, customary,
religious, and courtly, as well as the observances of .politeness, and
logicallv included the two previously mentioned virtues. This con-
cept of Li became the apotheosis of traditional morality, and carried
with it all the values of the traditional scheme of things.
Confucius may well be called the Socrates of China. Living
about three-quarters of a century before that thinker, like him, he
busied himself m endeavoring to build up a code of morals to buttress
the declining morality of his time. For him, as for Socrates, ethics
constituted the sum and substance of philosophy, and he refused to
go into other speculations. He was a faithful government official,
and so politics was the goal of philosophy.
As a basis for his ethics. Confucius brought forward a principle
which was new at that time in Chinese ethical thought, that of Jen
or "benevolence".^ The meaning of this term has been disputed,
but Confucius himself defined it as "Love your fellowmen."^ In
another passage he declared that "the man of Jen is one who de-
siring to maintain himself sustains others, and desiring to develop
himself develops others. To be able from one's self to draw a
parallel for the treatment of others—that may be called the rule of
Jen:"^ In other words, Jeji is the carrying out of the golden rule.
It is the highest of virtues,* and is the definition of the Superior
^lan.'^ Rut Jen is not love in the sense that we use the term. Con-
fucius made very much of the natural and social relationships of
prince and minister, father and son. older and younger brother,
husband and wife, and in each case there is a superior and inferior,
^The chief pieces of literature which we can assuredly date before the time
of Confucius are the Book of Odes and the Book of History. In the Odes, Jen
is used only twice, whereas Li is used six times ; in the Book of History, Jen
is used fiye times while Li is used nine times. Eyidently Jen did not become
.an important ethical concept until the time of Confucius; in the Analects it is
used fifty-four times as against forty-one times that Li is used.
-Analects XII, xxii.
^.Analects \'I, xxyiii.
*AnaIccts IV, yi, 1.
^An. IV, V, 2, 3.
142 THE OPEN COURT
SO the attitude of the superior should be different from that of the
inferior ; it is not the love of equals, but the benevolence of the prince
or paterfamilias ; kindness rather than love.®
But he was not consistent in his use of the term. As the highest
of virtues. Jen came to include the whole of virtue, to be equivalent
to virtue itself, and so to include other elements than love ; it is de-
fined as respect, mfegnamity, sincerity, earnestness, and kindness.'
and even applied to all, not merely to the superior.
In Confucius' use of this concept, he was getting away from
the ethics of authority. Jen was a general principle, just as was the
Golden Rule ; it was not a code of conduct already decided upon
for whose use only casuistry was required ; it was a principle which
each individual would have to apply for himself. We should re-
member in this connection that in Confucius' Silver Rule, "Do not
do to others as you would not have others do unto you", the nega-
tive form of statement is due to the peculiar genius of the Chinese
language, which prefers a negative to a positive statement, and that
when Confucius came to elucidate its meaning by the principle of
"reciprocity", he showed that he meant the Golden Rule in its post
tive form—which is but an expression of the principle of Jen, and in
Confucius' meaning thereof, had the limitations of Jen. Such an
attitude of kindness, or even a restricted love, is never a system of
enactments to be obeyed, but rather it is a principle, for which new
applications are continually occurring ; it is a principle of freedom,
not of authority, for it breaks thru every bond set for it. In so far,
Jen is the opposite of Li, and it is not surprising that in an age
which had been used to an authoritarian code, Confucius was asked
again and again to define Jen—to state what it meant in concrete
situations, so that people could know it just as they knew the code
prescribed by Li. Jen was a principle whose consistent application
would have carried Confucius into a break with the old order in
favor of the right of the individual to decide matters for himself.
But Confucius did not see whither this new principle was lead-
ing him. and he was extremely unwilling to break with the past. He
^'This is the sense in which it is invariably used in the Book of Odes and
the Book of History. In the Odes it is iisved in adulation of the ruler, in the
phrase "admirable and kind''. In the Book of History it is used once of King
T'ang. once of the ruler, twice of his ministers, and once of Duke Chou (Med
hurst's translation of V, vi, 6 is preferable to that of Legge), each time in-
dicating their attitude to their inferiors.
Vin. XVII, vi.
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did not see clearly what was implied in Jen, and in defining^ it, he
defined Jen by Li: "Jen is the denial of self and the response to Li."
.... Its main features are "if not Li do not look, if not Li do not
listen, if not Li do not speak, if not Li do not move."^ Thus Con-
fucius confused his principle of liberty with the traditional princi-
ple of authority. Indeed we find him speakin<j of Li almost as often
as Jen, and when we remember that Jen was the new thing-, which
would be likely to be spoken of more often than the Li which w^as
already understood, and when we remember Confucius' own fond-
ness for the proprieties and ceremonies, we realize that he empha-
sized Li iust as much as Jen. if not more.'' Hence we are not sur-
prised that in the most influential school of his immediate disciples,
that of Tsentze. "filial piety" and "reverence for the elder" were
exalted as the greatest virtues, and the Confucian influence returned
to an emphasis upon the traditional morality.
The Confucians were preeminently the conservors of the heritage
of the past. They edited the literary treasures of the past, pre-
served and embellished the traditions of the great Sages who were
the models of a virtuous life. They were the lil:)eral conservative
party, not the radical party. Reform of abuses was their aim, but
reform back to the ideals of the past, not towards a better state in
the future. For the radical movement we must look to the non-
Confucian philosophers of the time.
In the mists surrounding the beginning of Chinese philosophy,
Laotze stands out as a solitary, gigantic figure. He and Con-
fucius determined the course of subsequent Chinese thought. Laotze
realized that beauty and ugliness, goodness and evil, difficulty and
ease, long and short, sound and echo, were mutually involved in
each other; that without evil there would be nothing we call good;
without ugliness there would be nothing we call beauty. Hence the
way to get rid of evil is plain ; there is only one method, to get
rid of both of these opposites, good as well as evil, and return to the
simple primitive chaotic state when men knew neither good nor evil,
when the people of one valley looked over the hills to a neighboring
hamlet and heard their cocks crow, but all their lives never went
there : when there w^as no knowledge and hence no desire. This sort
of ethics with its abandonment of the world of action was too im-
Mn. XII, i- see also XII, ii; I. ii; III. iii.
^For a fuller discussion of this and other points, cf. "Hsiintze, the Moulder
of Ancient Confucianism" by H. H. Dubs, ch. VII and VIII.
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practical to appeal widely to the preeminently practical Chinese ; but
it represented a new thing in ethics—an ethical principle depending
on but o)ie principle, logically deduced, a characteristic which was
to have great results in the subsequent development of Chinese
ethics.
Micius or Mo Ti was a younger contemporary and fellow-
countryman of Confucius. A hard-working government official,
like Confucius, his sympathies were not confined to the ruling class
and to their rule of the people, as were those of Confucius, but
instead his sympathies were with the people and their own problems,
and so he reached a democratic rather than an aristocratic ethics.
It is possible that he was originally a disciple of Confucius, but with
a young man's zeal, he was impatient of Confucius' insistence upon
and preoccupation with ceremonies ; instead he was drawn to this
new principle of Jen, and he took it, universalized, and democratized
it into his famous principle of "Universal Love". Then he was
compelled to do what Confucius had refused to do, to break with the
past, and so he advocated the setting up of a new order free from
the weight of tradition. He now had to meet the tremendous
opposition of the conservatism of society, and he found himself de-
pending upon the persuasiveness of his ideal and the cogency of his
arguments to impress his contemporaries. So he did what Laotze
had done, he deduced his principles of ethics from one principle,
which he found in "what is beneficial". His was a utilitarianism
with Universal Love as its chief principle. Likewise he developed
a set of canons of proof. So it is no wonder that this unified sys-
tem, with everything proceeding from one self-evident principle,
should have proved extremely persuasive, and that Micianism came
to be a very dangerous rival of Confucianism, and to contest for-
midably with it for the su])remacy.
Rut Micius was unfortimate in not having any successors as
great as he. The most brilliant of his followers developed his teach-
ing in the direction of metaphysical and epistemological specula-
tions, rather than in ethics, and these Neo-Micians degenerated into
propounders of logical puzzles, like those of Zeno and the Greek
sophists, instead of becoming the ethical and religious rejuvenators
of the Chinese world. While Micianism challenged Confucianism
for some centuries, it eventually died a natural death, aided by the
constant stabs given it by the Confucians.
The pessimism and relativism of Laotze found expression in the
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indivichialist Yangtze. To him no universals could have any real
existence, only the individual was important ; consequently there
could he no ethical standard except that of the individual's own
satisfaction. He attacked all the worthies of old and praised those
who sought their indi\idual enjoyment rather than the good of
society. As ]\Iencius said of him. he would not sacrifice a hair
to save the world. He represented the extreme reaction to the bury-
ing of the individual in the family and social organization by those
Confucians who emphasized filial piety and family solidarity. Yang-
tze had little permanent influence ; the solidarity of the Chinese fam-
ily prevented his teachings from becoming influential.
If Confucius was the Socrates of China, then ^lencius was its
Plato, with whom he was a contemporary for the last quarter
century of Plato's life. Like him, he developed and oriented his
Master's teachings, although he had not the metaphysical and logical
interests that characterized Plato. For the Confucians, as for Con-
fucius, ethics and politics constituted the whole of philosophy, and
anything else was unnecessary or possibly harmful. ^lencius felt the
persuasiveness of a philosophy that was developed from one princi-
ple, such as that of Micius. In common with all the other philoso-
phers of his day, he felt that anything natural was good, and so he
tried to find a basis in human nature, which was naturally good,
for the Confucian ethics. Since human nature is good, the full ex-
pression of the natural feelings of man would give the whole of
ethics.
"The feeling of commiseration is essential to man ; the feeling of
shame and dislike is essential to man ; the feeling of modesty and
complaisance is essential to man : and the feeling of approving and
disapproving is essential to man. The feeling of commiseration is
the principle of Jen. The feeling of shame and dislike is the principle
of Yi (justice, St/catom'i'?^, giving each his due). The feeling of
modesty and complaisance is the principle of Li. The feeling of
approving and disapproving is the principle of wisdom. Men have
these four principles just as they have their four liiubs Let
them have their complete development, and they will suffice to pro-
vide for all within the country."'"
The principle of deducing ethics from the full expression of es-
sential human feelings, if logically carried out, would have taken
Mencius completely out of the orthodox Confucian stream of
'^^Mencins II, i, vi. 4-7.
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thought, just as Micius was carried out by his principle and broke
with the past. For this principle of developing every man's innate
endowment would have done away with all external authority. If
every man can reach the truth simply by developing what is within
him, then what is the need for Sages and the standards they
worked out ; what is the need even for the teachings of Confucius,
who by this time had already been made one of the Sages ; indeed,
what is the need of any authority at all? Each man need rely only
upon himself. Had Mencius been a little bolder and less inclined to
follow the path already marked out, he might have seen these im-
plications of his teaching, and have broken through the crust of Con-
fucianism, just as did Micius. But the crust was too strong for him.
He drew back, and emphasized Li just as did the other Confucians ;
though in his teaching this principle does not assume the importance
it assumed in that of others. In one saying he subordinated every-
thing else to L?*,-^^ he gave his mother an especially splendid funeral
;
he induced the prince of Lu to make an innovation by mourning three
years for the death of his father ; and he even taught that the care
of parents is not as important as their obsequies, thus stressing the
various elements of Li. He could not have deduced these observ-
ances from the feeling of modesty and complaisance ; like the othtx
Confucians, he simply took over the traditional observances.
Chuangtze, the Heraclitus of China, was the only one of these
philosophers who broke from the universal application of philosophy
to practical, affairs and did not propound a political theory. For him
change was fundamental, and everything was relative. A keen
critic, he saw the flaws in the other philosophies, and criticised them
unmercifully. Against the Micians he showed that not the right,
but the plausible, is the most persuasive ; against the Confucians he
urged that all change is by natural law, so why seek to reform any-
thing? He picked flaws in the ancient Sages, flouted their imper-
fections, and criticised the impeccable Confucius himself. His es-
pecial detestation was the Confucian ceremonies and Li. Against
their elaborate burial ceremonies he urged that "real mourning
grieves in silence", and that "our emotions are dependent upon the
original purity within, and it matters not what ceremonies are em-
ployed". "Ceremonial is the invention of man." But his positive
teaching was fatalism and ethical relativism ; the best that anyone
'^''^Mencius IV, i, xxvii.
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could do was to be content with his lot and undisturbed at life or
death.
Confucianism was in a dangerous situation. It realized the
values that were enshrined in the heritage of the past, and its own
importance as to the conserv^or of that heritage, but with such violent
and trenchant attacks from without, and with its own leaders equivo-
cating as to fundamental principles, it seemed as if Confucianism
must be overcome. In this situation, it produced a third great leadei,
who came to the rescue.
lust as Aristotle organized the Platonic philosophy into the first
philosophic system, so Hsiintze, the younger contemporary of Men-
cius, developed Confucianism into a consistent and logical philoso-
phy. A true follower of Confucius, a keen critic, and an extremely
logical thinker, he gave to Confucianism its final shape as the con-
servative and authoritarian philosophy of China. Like the other
Confucians, he had no special interest in metaphysics, yet he found
himself drawn into it more than they. Recognized as the leader of
Confucianism in his lifetime, he made it his business to refute and
attack other unorthodox philosophies, and to fix the Confucian
canon and teaching.
Hsiintze saw clearly how Mencius' principle that ethics is the
development of innate human feelings would lead away from Con-
fucius' own principles ; and he came to clearness as to just what
was the position of Confucianism. He saw that it -stood for author-
ity, in contrast to the individualism represented by the unorthodox
teachings. Nevertheless he was able to give Jen a real place in an
authoritarian system. While in political theory he followed Men-
cius in almost all points, yet in the basis of his ethics, he saw that
Mencius had been untrue to the spirit of Confucianism. Conse-
quently he criticised and opposed Mencius' doctrine of human na-
ture.
Mencius had deduced his theory from the assumption that human
nature was good ; Hsiintze declared that human nature is evil, and
found no difficulty, in that troubled time, in adducing empirical evi-
dence to that effect. The theory that human nature is evil may not
be flattering to men's vanity, but it furnishes an impregnable foun-
dation for any doctrine of authority. The Catholic theologians
found this to be the case, when, by denouncing human nature as de-
praved and sinful, they were able to show that the sinner cannot
even know the truth without the mediation of an authoritative bodv
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of truth in the hands of an authoritative institution. Hsiintze did not
go so far as they did. He did not hold that man's nature is utterly
depraved ; he believed in no fall of mankind. He merely held that
human nature, left to itself, inevitably tends to evil ; hence the
Confucian Tao or Way is absolutely necessary to develop human
nature, and to train it to goodness. This is his famous doctrine that
human nature is evil.
On this basis, an authoritatively given code of ethics is clearly
seen to be necessary, and it was undoubtedly the need of establishing
an unshakable foundation for the Confucian authoritarian ethic that
led Hsiintze into postulating the evil tendency of original human
nature, since we find no such theory anywhere else in the thought
of the time. Consequently we find Hsiintze making Li his chief vir-
tue, developing it and rationalizing it as never before. Part of his
writings were incorporated into the Book of Rites, together with the
larger collection, the Ritual of the Senior Tai, and Sze-ma Ch'ien's
Historical Record quoted him extensively.
There was still the problem as to where his authoritarian code
came from. Hsiintze believed in no God or spiritual Heaven ; he
could have no revelation. But the answer to this problem was plain
to him : it was the Sages, the Sage-Kings, the culture heroes who had
developed the Chinese civilization, who had promulgated this code.
And how had they come by it ? Through the cultivation of their own
original natures. -They were no dififerent fromi the rest of humanity
in original nature ; but they were able to overcome their limitations
by training and make themselves perfectly good. Similarly every-
one else has the possibility of training himself to a state of Sage-
hood by following their example. Here Hsiintze found a place
for Confucius' principle of Jen—it is the characteristic of the Sage
;
when the Sage has developed himself, he can do the right without
efifort ; he can discern the right without being blinded by false teach-
ings or evil desires. He follows his desires and gives rein to hfs
passions, yet does right. Thus freedom and authority are reconciled
in the person of the Sage.
Such was the form that Confucianism finally took, and the fact
that authoritarianism triumphed in Confucianism is clearly shown
by subsequent events. The Mician teaching died out. The philoso-
phies of Laotze and Chuangtze degenerated into the magical and
superstitious Taoism which merely perpetuated the original Chinese
animism, which the religious agnosticism of Confucius and the skep-
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ticism of Hsuntze had divorced from Confucianism. Confucianism
became the orthodox philosophy of China, and in so doing, it de-
veloped a canon and an orthodox formulation. In this process it
necessarily became authoritarian. But in the consecjuent decay of
philosophical ori.ginality, Hsiintze's unflattering doctrine of human
nature brought him into disfavor. In the Han revival of learning,
Tung Chung-shu, the greatest of Confucians, lauded Hsuntze : and
in the T'ang period. Han Yii. the greatest of Chinese literatteurs,
ranked Hsuntze as second only to Mencius. It was not until the
Sung period that Hsuntze was definitely condemned as unsound by
Chu Hsi, the Confucian Thomas Acquinus. To Chu Hsi, nature
was Nature, not merely human nature, but the Nature of the uni-
verse, and to say that nature is evil meant that the Universe is evil.
Hence Hsuntze must be wrong and unsound. But the conception of
Confucianism as authority, which Hsiintze had so clearly preached,
had become fixed in the Confucian tradition, and Chu Hsi himself
accepted it—it became the center of his dogmatism, and subsequent
generations have been compelled to conform to his interpretation of
Confucianism. Chu Hsi kept Hsiintze's doctrine that man's nature
is evil in a difi^erent form : he said instead that "the human heart is
rarely pure. It is often in error : when it is cultivated, it is pure ;
when it is allowed to go its own way. it falls into error". Hence it
must be closed against error and false teachings. Although Chu Hsi
stressed Mencius, yet in the theoretical foundation of his ethics, he
is a follower of Hsuntze. It was Wang Yang-ming, with his em-
phasis upon the heart, who was the true follower of the Alencian
teachings that virtue is the development of the individual's capacities.
But Wang Yang-ming was practically condemned as a heretic.
So authority conquered in ancient China as it did everywhere
else in the ancient world, although not without meeting strenuous
opposition. Now that Western influences have broken up the Con-
fucian medievalism, the Chinese are turning back to their glorious
period of ancient philosophy and revaluing its thought. As the
battle of freedom and authority is refought, may we not expect a
different result than before?
